Militias in the Modern State: How Rio’s Paramilitary Networks Privatize Security, Control Votes, and Turn Protection Fees into Political Power

Asymmetric Warfare

How Militias evolved from police service providers to entrenched power brokers using bureaucracy, public contracts, and voter blocs

Militias are not merely armed groups fighting in the margins, they are an emergent model of governance that blurs the line between state and private enterprise. In Bruno Paes Manso’s investigation, The Republic of Militias, he argues that these networks did not start as insurgents, but as service providers born inside the institutions meant to protect citizens. As Manso puts it, “a parallel order born not outside the state, but from within its bloodstream.”

From guardians to gatekeepers

In neighborhoods where public services were sporadic and formal oversight weak, police officers, firefighters, and prison guards reinvented their roles. What began as community protection rhetoric quickly became a system of control. Militias offered order, but they also demanded payment. Residents who once called the police for help found that the same institutions now charged monthly “protection fees.” That model turned safety into a subscription, and turned elected offices and municipal resources into instruments of profit.

Unlike traffickers who rely on disorder to secure territory, militias learned to navigate bureaucracy. They mastered public procurement, voter registries, and property markets. Manso warns that “a rifle gives power. A badge gives immunity. A voting block gives permanence.” This is a crucial distinction: when armed actors achieve legitimacy through formal political ties, they can entrench themselves beyond the reach of short-term police operations.

Administration as the primary weapon

Militias weaponize administration. Their dominance is not chaos, it is order, and it is profitable. They monopolize essential services: gas distribution, cable and internet, commuter vans, and real estate transactions that result in forced evictions. They do not burn buses to send a message, they tax the riders who board them. As Manso succinctly states, “Their weapon is not chaos — it is administration.” That sentence reframes how governments should think about security: the enemy can be a contractor, a union of corrupt officials, or a provider of essential services that quietly extorts the population.

Counterinsurgency-style raids and high-profile incursions often make for visible, countable victories, but they rarely touch the paperwork that sustains militia power. “You don’t pacify a spreadsheet with an armored vehicle,” Manso writes. Eliminating an armed cell does not undo a network of contracts, local political alliances, and informal monopolies that feed on everyday transactions.

The real battlefield: citizenship versus privatized power

The rise of militias erodes the social contract. When the state becomes a franchiser of coercion, citizenship itself is diminished. Public institutions that should guarantee rights instead collaborate with, or are captured by, private security networks. Manso offers a stark image: “the state didn’t collapse. It franchised itself into a business model, and armed men became shareholders.” That formulation forces policymakers to consider corruption and privatized violence as systemic problems, not isolated crimes.

Addressing militias requires more than police operations. It demands transparency in procurement, robust oversight of public servants, protections for electoral integrity, and community-centered service provision that restores trust in the state. Legal reforms must target the structural incentives that allow militias to monetize public needs, from energy distribution to transportation.

For audiences who follow global security trends, the lesson is urgent. Militias are not confined to one city or country. Wherever institutions are intermittent and politics porous, similar models can emerge. Recognizing the pattern is the first step. Confronting it means shifting the focus from short-term tactical victories to long-term institutional repair and civic resilience.

Bruno Paes Manso’s reporting reframes a familiar conflict. The fight is no longer only against armed rivals in the shadows, it is against a systematic privatization of power that masquerades as order, but ends in the erosion of rights. Understanding Militias as political and economic actors, not merely security threats, is essential to restoring genuine public authority and protecting citizens from being turned into consumers of their own safety.

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