Major Charlie Phelps says drones and maneuver warfare are complementary, offering real-time awareness, precision strike, and force multiplication for future large-scale fights
The debate over the role of unmanned systems in land combat has sharpened since the Russo-Ukrainian War. Critics warn that a rush to field drones will push the U.S. Army toward a style of fighting that emphasizes fires and attrition over speed and initiative. As one recent assessment put it, “Drones won’t save us? That’s the argument Matthew Revels and Eric Uribe made in a recent MWI article urging caution as the US Army, reacting to the drone-saturated battlefields of the Russo-Ukrainian War, seeks to aggressively buy and integrate drones into its formations and operations.”
Major Charlie Phelps, a Special Forces company commander in 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), answers that warning directly. He argues that drones and maneuver warfare are not at odds, but rather mutually reinforcing tools that can restore the Army’s historic advantages in tempo, initiative, and precision. Phelps contends that a focus on countering enemy drones at the expense of equipping maneuver units with their own robotic capabilities is a strategic mistake.
Why some see a clash between drones and maneuver
Critics, including Revels and Uribe, worry that widespread adoption of drones will mimic Russian practices in Ukraine, where massed fires and attrition have been prominent. That argument rests on valid historical comparisons. The U.S. way of war, from the Gulf War to campaign plans in Afghanistan, has long tied airpower and precision to offensive maneuver. The fear is that a doctrinal pivot toward drones could tilt the balance away from rapid, decisive operations and toward attritional battles fought on firepower.
Those concerns are worth heeding, but they assume a narrow use of drones limited to replacing traditional fires. Phelps rejects that assumption. He warns that confining drone employment to a single warfighting function would “severely limit” their potential, and that tactical commanders should instead use drones to expand options for maneuver at the point of contact.
How drones amplify tempo, initiative, and precision
At the core of Phelps’s argument is a simple operational logic. Drones offer persistent, real-time situational awareness that commanders can use to make faster decisions, seize fleeting opportunities, and outpace adversary reactions. Reconnaissance drones with advanced sensors can map enemy positions, track movement, and reveal vulnerabilities that a maneuver commander can exploit. Phelps notes how historical operations, like the Gulf War “left hook,” depended on intelligence to find weak points. He writes that drones could have provided “persistent surveillance and reducing reliance on slower, more vulnerable reconnaissance assets.”
Beyond sensing, drones act as a force multiplier by delivering precision effects to small units. Loitering munitions and FPV strike drones let maneuver elements engage high-value targets without waiting for air or heavy fires. Deployed in sufficient numbers, they can saturate enemy defenses, disrupt command-and-control nodes, and target logistics and artillery, creating corridors for rapid maneuver. This is especially relevant when traditional air superiority or long-range fires are contested.
Phelps imagines tactical leaders exercising mission command with both piloted and autonomous systems. He uses a concrete example to make the point: imagine if H. R. McMaster, leading a formation integrated with piloted and autonomous drones, “had conducted a deliberate attack at 73 Easting instead of a react to contact.” That hypothetical underscores how faster information and distributed strike change the options available to subordinate commanders, improving initiative at the point of friction.
Why offensive drone investment matters as much as counterdrone defenses
There is no disagreement that counterdrone systems, integrated air defense, and electronic warfare are essential. Phelps acknowledges the threats posed by an enemy’s unmanned and automated systems. Still, he warns that an exclusive emphasis on defense risks ceding initiative. In maneuver warfare, the side that moves faster, disrupts first, and forces an enemy reaction typically gains the advantage.
Phelps argues the Army should not choose between offense and defense, but balance both. Offensive drone capabilities give commanders resilient options inside contested air, cyber, and electromagnetic environments. Small autonomous systems that can identify and strike targets with minimal delay would reduce the time between detection and action, preserving tempo even when higher echelons are contested.
Practical steps to integrate drones into maneuver units
Based on Phelps’s framing, practical integration requires changes in training, command relationships, and procurement. Units must train with mixed manned-unmanned packages until leaders and staffs understand how to delegate sensors and strike authorities under mission command. Doctrine needs to recognize drones as tools for sensing, shaping, and striking in direct support of maneuver, not just as adjuncts to fires.
Procurement should prioritize scalable, interoperable systems that commanders at company and battalion level can employ without re-routing effects through distant nodes. Equally important, units must develop tactics to preserve drone utility in contested environments, using redundancy, dispersion, and electromagnetic maneuver to keep robotic effects available when adversaries attempt suppression.
Phelps’s view is rooted in his operational perspective. He closes his piece with a clear declaration, and MWI’s site notes the author’s affiliation, “Major Charlie Phelps is a Special Forces officer and currently serves as a company commander in 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne).” The Modern War Institute also reminds readers that, “The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the authors are affiliated with.”
For policymakers and senior commanders, the takeaway is not that drones are a silver bullet, but that drones and maneuver warfare can and should be integrated to preserve the Army’s advantages. Embracing tactical unmanned systems while hardening defenses against enemy robots keeps the initiative in American hands, and creates more options for decisive, expeditionary operations in future large-scale fights.
